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Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data 
Farming Workshop is named after a 
farming implement. In farming, a 
scythe is used to clear and harvest. We 
hope that the “Scythe” will perform a 
similar role for our data farming 
community by being a tool to help 
prepare for our data farming efforts 
and harvest the results. The Scythe is 
provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu.  
Please contact the editors for 
additional paper copies.
Please let us know what you think of 
this fifth prototypical issue. Articles, 
ideas for articles and material, and 
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Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of 
Data Farming, its methodologies, applications, 
tools, and evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the 
biannual International Data Farming Workshops, 
where researchers participate in team-oriented 
model development, experimental design, and 
analysis using high performance computing 
resources... that is, Data Farming. 
Scythe, Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming Community, Issue 5, 





We had the pleasure of visiting beautiful Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany for International Data Farming Workshop 17! 
It was held from September 21st through the 26th, 2008.  Our the theme was “Discovering Surprises,” and the goal, as usual, was 
to use our data farming methods to continue to explore our important questions.  The plan continues to be to hold even-
numbered workshops once a year in Monterey with odd-numbered workshops taking place at international venues.
As the executive director of the Center, it is my pleasure to work with many from around the world to develop the methods 
of Data Farming and apply them to important questions of our day.  And on behalf of the co-directors of the SEED Center for 
Data Farming, Professors Tom Lucas and Susan Sanchez, I would like to express our thanks to the team leaders, the plenary 
speakers and all of the participants in IDFW 17.
This issue, our fifth, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort.  And as always, the plenary session 
materials, in-briefs, and out-briefs from this workshop are available online at http://harvest.nps.edu along with electronic copies 
of this issue of The Scythe.  And now I would like to briefly outline the work of the ten teams and invite you to examine the 
details of their efforts later in this issue of The Scythe. 
Team 1 examined the possibilities of performing analyses using PAX in the context of a multinational Peace Support 
Operation including Humanitarian Assistance dealing with disaster caused refugee movements that require military action. The 
team's primary goal during IDFW17 was to develop and refine appropriate calibration methods. This goal includes identifying 
suitable Measures of Effectiveness and the necessary set of parameters to vary during calibration as well as examining different 
calibration methods, including large experiments with various Designs of Experiment, optimization using Automated Red 
Teaming functionalities, and a focused mini-scenario experiment.
Team 2 explored the use of PSOM (Peace Support Operations Model) originally conceived and developed by the Defense 
Science and Technology Laboratory in the UK and now the subject of a  joint UK-US development effort.  PSOM was designed to 
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Discovering Surprises
International Data Farming Workshop 17
September 2008, Garmisch - Partenkirchen 
be a turn-based interactive wargame.  It supports multiple factions (e.g. regular militaries from various nations, civil government, 
insurgents of various stripes) that can each be controlled by human players operating independently based on the limited 
intelligence picture available to their  specific force. The task facing team 2 at this workshop was to determine if PSOM would be 
suitable for data farming.
Team 3 explored Human Intangibles (HI), a multifaceted element of human factors. Because of the complexity and 
difficulties in modeling HI, many modelers have omitted this aspect when carrying out studies and have focused only on the 
more tangibles factors.  In some scenarios, these intangibles often play a greater role in deciding the battle outcome than other 
conventional factors like firepower, logistics, or mobility.  The team objectives for this workshop included exploring HI and 
developing a framework for HI modeling in MANA, as well as developing a scenario to test the framework.  
Team 4 continued an effort using the agent-based sensor effector model (ABSEM) recently developed in Germany.  This new 
agent-based model is to be used for analyzing the combination of various sensor and effector systems in network centric 
operations.  Using a camp protection scenario, the team's objective was to investigate the effect of different electro-optical sensor 
systems within a dynamic environment.  Overall, the team had the goals of reviewing and face validating the first ABSEM 
prototype version 0.1, conducting data farming experiments using common data farming tools, and identifying needs for further 
work.
Team 5 studied the effects of terrain on systems of systems in combat operations. Modern warfare is characterized by the use 
of combined arms where various types of forces come together to fight as a single entity, as a  system-of-systems. Typically, for 
land forces, systems of systems are battalion level and above. In this workshop, the terrain that was selected to be studied was the 
urban terrain. The team explored the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the defender with the specific aim to determine 
how the defender should locate his defensive positions and also how reserves should be deployed. 
Team 6 was led by personnel from the Joint Test and Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) program. Their goal was to conduct a 
capability evaluation strategy refinement process for testing in a joint environment.  These activities were supported by a 
prototyped automated capability test methodology evaluation thread builder and agent-based simulation tools developed by 
JTEM.  The use case scenario for this data farming team exercise was based on a command and control joint capability area and 
focused on joint fires and close air support mission task threads developed as part of a JTEM 2008 test event. 
Team 7 was not a  traditional IDFW team.  Work in the area of modeling PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, 
Infrastructure, and Information) questions is nascent and this team was a “discussion” team, designed to begin the discourse on 
the value of various models and potential data farming that may impact upon examining the relationships and outcomes 
resulting from interactions among PMESII elements in various situations.
Team 8 adapted an existing computer model that simulates activities of the human immune system for use in the 
workshop’s data farming setting.  A group at The Ohio State University College of Medicine developed the model, the Basic 
Immune Simulator (BIS), an agent-based model that simulates aspects of the human immune system, in particular, the 
interaction between innate and adaptive immunity.  The team modified the BIS model to make it easily data farmable and 
subsequently performed several computational experiments.
Team 9 tied a high resolution communications model to New Zealand’s agent based model MANA.  The resulting link 
between the two models simulated MANA's situational awareness messages through the full protocol stack of a simulated 
network and returns the completed messages to MANA during run-time. The team was interested in exercising this combined 
modeling tool to better understand the impact of communications assumptions, particularly in an urban environment. 
Team 10 members were not able to be present in Garmisch-Partenkirchen during September because of scheduling 
difficulties.  However, in the spirit data farming, they did not want to break their uninterrupted IDFW string of advances in 
examining combat identification and fratricide.  So they met at a side meeting of IDFW 17, which was held in the Hague on the 
13th and 14th of October 2008.  The goal for IDFW 17 of the Combat ID team was to use the model they have developed to 
discover the influence of different factors on the effectiveness of the Combat ID process.
So as you can see, IDFW 17 was once again a  forum for abundant international collaboration.  And more detail regarding the 
work of each team can be found later in this issue of The Scythe.  But I would like to take the opportunity now to give a special 
thanks to our host Dr. Klaus-Peter Schwierz and all of his German colleagues who helped to make this workshop, the third to be 
held in Germany, possible!
Now looking ahead, our Data Farming community will be back in Monterey for our next workshop, International Data 
Farming Workshop 18.  I would like to invite you to participate, starting with the opening dinner on Sunday 22 March 2009 and 
continuing through the week with the closing session on Friday 27 March.  Our theme for IDFW 18 is...  Dynamic Truths.
We hope to see you there!
           
Gary Horne
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Team 1: PAX Refugee Camp Scenario Phase I: 
Model Calibration in Preparation of Validation
TEAM 1 MEMBERS
Lt Col Stephan SEICHTER – Lead
Bundeswehr Transformation Center, Germany
Gunther SCHWARZ – Co-Lead
Thorsten LAMPE – Technical Lead
EADS System Design Center, Germany
Chwee Seng CHOO
Choon Kiat Dave ANG
DSO National Laboratories, Singapore
Prof. Dr. Susan HEATH
Naval Postgraduate School, USA
Capt Heiko ABEL
Naval Postgraduate School / German Navy, Germany
Lt Col Dr. Dietmar KUNDE
Federal Office of the Bundeswehr for Information 
Management and Information Technology, Germany
Figure 1 – Team Members
INTRODUCTION & GOALS
The German Bundeswehr Transformation Center has 
initiated a series of studies to explore research areas for the 
implementation of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) 
effectively supporting Concept Development and 
Experimentation (CD&E). One study examines the 
possibilities of performing analyses using PAX in the context 
of a multinational Peace Support Operation (PSO) including 
Humanitarian Assistance dealing with disaster caused 
refugee movements that require military action. The military 
forces are tasked to assist in building and operating refugee 
camps and, in particular, to ensure order and security.
The team's primary goal during IDFW17 was to develop 
and refine appropriate calibration methods. This goal includes 
identifying suitable Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) and the 
necessary set of parameters to vary during calibration as well 
as examining different calibration methods, including large 
experiments with various Designs of Experiment (DoE), 
optimization using Automated Red Teaming (ART) 
functionalities, and a focused mini-scenario experiment.
THE SCENARIO
The applied scenario models the distribution of aid packages 
in a refugee camp (see Figure 2), supervised by soldiers. 
Three major groups of refugees are present in the camp, 
represented by "normal", "cautious" and "aggressive" 
civilians.
Figure 2 – Refugee camp ("macro scenario") in PAX
Questions subject to analyses are for example:
• Identification of equitable and evenhanded 
distribution strategies with respect to the different 
refugee groups and their individual emotional 
attitudes like aggression and fear.
• Identification of groups or individuals unable to 
receive the needed goods.
• Effectiveness of military strategies, ranging from de-
escalation to deterrence in the given context.
APPROACH FOR CALIBRATION
Preceding the calibration efforts, important MoEs to 
determine the quality of calibration had to be ascertained. 
The related discussion, involving "subject matter expertise" 
on refugee camp management, lead to the identification of 
the following MoEs reflecting the most important indicators 
of agent behavior:
• Total number of aid packages distributed
• Number of aid packages distributed to {aggressive, 
normal,  cautious} civilians
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• Aggregated escalation
• Number of {attack,   threaten} actions performed by 
civilians
• Number of pacifying actions performed by soldiers
Taking into consideration the structure and interplay 
between PAX model parameters, we determined a minimal 
but sufficient parameter subset to vary in order to calibrate the 
model to the MoEs and to also have a manageable experiment 
size (Table 1, values in the middle column). Furthermore, an 
initial process for calibration was developed combining large 
scale calibration, micro scenario analysis and ART optimization.
The term large scale  calibration defines a cyclic procedure 
with appropriate experimental designs that iteratively adjusts 
the respective parameter ranges until they can be evaluated as 
satisfying for the given setting.
The micro scenario analysis looks at an appropriately 
downscaled scenario with the goal of identifying realistic 
ranges for the parameter(s) subject to calibration. Having 
evaluated the results to the desired degree, the applicability of 
the effects in a macro scenario has to be proven.
Optimization using ART seeks to optimize selected 
MoE(s) towards desired, better more realistic and feasible 
target values. 
Parameter to be calibrated Range/ValExp #1
Range/Val
Exp #2
Aggressive group Dog Factor [0.5;3.0] [0.5;5.0]
Normal group Dog Factor [0.5;3.0] [2.0]
Cautious group Dog Factor [0.5;3.0] [2.0]
Aggressive group – 
get_many_packages [70;100] [90;100]
Normal group Need [70;100] [80;90]
Cautious group Need [70;100] [70;80]
Aggressive group PC_Anger [0;50] [10;50]
Normal group  PC_Anger [30;100] [30;80]
Cautious group PC_Anger [30;100] [50;100]
Aggressive group PC_Fear [30;100] [30;100]
Normal group PC_Fear [30;100] [30;80]
Cautious group PC_Fear [0;50] [10;50]
Aggr. Group RfA [30;100] [30;100]
Norm. group RfA [0;Aggr.] [10;Aggr.]
Caut. group RfA [0;Norm] [10;Norm]
Soldiers' stress factor (SWC) [0;100] [0;5]
Soldiers' ideal stress value [0;100] [20;40]
Escalation until arrest threshold [10;200] [10;100]
Table 1 - NOLH experiment (1+2) parameters
for calibration and value ranges explored
LARGE-SCALE CALIBRATION
To design the first large scale experiment, applicable ranges 
for each of the calibration parameters had to be determined. 
In some cases, such as the Readiness for Aggression (RfA) 
parameters for each group of civilians, certain range 
relationships seemed logical, e.g. 
cgRfA < ngRfA < agRfA
with {n,a,c}g = {normal,aggressive,cautious} group.
The (NOLH) design worksheet was chosen as 
experimental design. In order to achieve independence among 
the RfA  parameters for the groups, a transformation of the 
ngRfA  and cgRfA parameters was performed by introducing 
RfA multipliers, both varied between 0 and 1:
ngRfA = agRfA * ngRfAmultiplier
cgRfA = ngRfA* cgRfAmultiplier
with {n,a,c}g = {normal,aggressive,cautious} group. 
Analyzing Procedure
The following 4-step-procedure to analyze the results of the 
experiment was developed:
• Step 1: Regression tree analysis to determine the 
parameters most influential on each MoE.
• Step 2: Distribution plots for each MoE of the results 
and identification of design points producing 'outliers' 
by means of extreme or unrealistic results.
• Step 3: For each 'outlier' identified in step 2, look at the 
parameter values in that design point for each of the 
parameters determined to be 'most influential' in step 
1. If the parameter values are grouped together within 
that parameter's range, consider reducing that 
parameter's range to exclude those values. 
• Step 4: Run another experiment if parameter ranges 
were altered and perform steps 1-3 on the new results.
In performing step 3, we had to keep reminding 
ourselves that we wanted to alter the parameters during the 
calibration process to prevent unrealistic agent behavior and 
not to exclude agent behavior that would be considered 
undesirable when using the calibrated model for future 
experimentation.
Step 1: Regression Trees
After performing step 1 on the MoE Total number of aid 
packages distributed, we discovered that there was no most 
influential parameter. In fact, the total number of packages 
distributed seemed to have very little variability across all 
the design points (Figure 3). 
! Figure 3 – Regression tree of the MOE 
"Total Number of Packages Distributed"
Indeed there was great variation in the MoEs that 
measure who got the packages (Figures 4-6), which seemed 
fairly realistic. Therefore, the MoE Total Number of Packages 
Distributed was rejected for calibration.
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Figure 4 – Regression tree of the MOE 
"Number of Packages Distributed to the Aggressive Group"
Figure 5 – Regression tree of the MOE 
"Number of Packages Distributed to the Normal Group"
Figure 6 – Regression tree of the MOE 
"Number of Packages Distributed to the Cautious Group"
Most influential  parameters could be identified by 
analyzing the MoEs Number of aid packages distributed to 
each group, e.g. Aggressive group PC_Anger  for the number of 
packages distributed to aggressive civilians (Figure 4).
That was not surprising, in contrast to the fact that lower 
PC_Anger settings resulted in less aid packages being 
distributed to that group. This result could be realistic if 
highly angry individuals are more concerned with engaging 
others instead of collecting packages.
The influential parameters for the normal group's 
number of packages distributed (Figure 5) were a little 
surprising in that they actually were parameters 
characterizing other groups (Aggressive PC_Anger, Cautious 
PC_Fear):
The cautious group's influential parameters (Figure 6) 
were fairly predictable (Cautious PC_Fear, Cautious Need) 
except for being influenced somewhat by the Soldiers' Stress 
Weighting Constant (SWC). 
Step 2 and 3: Distribution Plots
Steps 2 and 3 of the analysis were performed on the MoE of 
Number of Packages Distributed to the Cautious Group. The 
distribution of results (Figure 7) reveals significant 
variability: The chart shows three data points far below the 
rest of the data points. 
Figure 7 – Distribution of the MOE "Number of Packages 
Distributed to the Cautious Group”
The influential parameters for that MoE are Cautious 
PC_Fear, Cautious_Need  and Soldiers' SWC. Their values are as 
follows:
Cautious PC_Fear: 2 2 0
Cautious_Need: 74 72 76
Soldiers' SWC: 63 53 76
The parameter values for PC_Fear are at the extreme low 
end of the preset range [0,50] and thus of the standard 
software range [0,100]. We considered the possibility that the 
extreme values for this parameter might not be realistic. 
Therefore we chose to narrow the range of this parameter. 
Although the Cautious_Need values are also at the low end of 
the actual range of [70,100] that we tested, they are not as 
tightly grouped relative to the tested. Therefore this range was 
left unchanged. The Soldiers' SWC values were neither tightly 
grouped nor at the extremes of the tested range. No changes 
to this parameter range were applied. All other MoEs but one 
that is analyzed below, were treated in a similar way.
The MoE Number of Pacifying Actions by Soldiers 
(Figure 8) was shown to be most influenced by the parameters 
Soldiers' SWC and the cautious group's Dog Factor for the 
Military (DFM, an indicator of how intimidated the cautious 
group is by military actions). DFM’s influence was surprising. 
The expectation was that some measure of anger or RfA for 
the aggressive group would be much more likely influential.
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Figure 8 – Regression tree of the MOE 
"Number of Pacifying Actions by Soldiers"
The MoE’s distribution (Figure 9) prompted even more 
discussion. The most extreme outliers are two data points 
with large numbers of pacifying actions by the soldiers. The 
surprise was how many design points resulted in zero 
pacifying actions. This result seemed highly unrealistic. Zero 
pacifying actions could be caused by two different situations: 
the soldiers performed no actions at all in response to the 
ones of civilians or the soldiers mainly performed extreme 
actions (threatening/attacking civilians). 
The Soldiers' SWC for these cases were extreme low (0, 1 
of the range [0;100]). Taking into consideration that more 
pacifying actions seemed likely to be a more realistic behavior 
in this type of scenario rather than less realistic, the group 
started to adjust the range of Soldiers' SWC values. Reducing 
the upper end of the range for this parameter sharply lead to 
more realistic numbers of pacifying actions. Recalling the 
regression tree analysis (Figure 7) and the split at a value of 4, 
we chose to use 5 as the upper value on the new range for 
Soldiers' SWC.
Figure 9 – Distribution of the MOE 
"Number of Pacifying Actions by Soldiers"
Step 4: New Experiment
According to step 4 of the analyzing procedure, we ran a 
second experiment. Parameter ranges were changed 
according to the results of the analysis of the first run. 
Column 2 of Table 1 shows the parameter settings for the 
second experiment, adjusted values in bold numbers Once 
again, a NOLH experimental design was chosen. 
The performed data analysis showed that the most 
influential  parameters did change for some MoEs to a certain 
degree. The distributions for all but one MoE had less outliers. 
The examination of some tail results showed that the 
underlying parameter  values did not seem to be clustered at 
the ends of the parameters' ranges as what had been observed 
in many cases in the first experiment. Overall these new 
calibrated ranges seemed to be much better than the original 
ranges. The need for further analysis could be narrowed 
down to only one MoE distribution that still had quite 
noticeable outliers: the Number of Pacifying Actions by 
Soldiers. Still, the soldiers' SWC was most influential. Further 
analysis on this parameter with respect to this MoE was 
required and will be described in the next section. 
The discussion of the large-scale approach evaluated that 
method effective and able to get some very good results in 
improving input parameter ranges with respect to analyzed 
MoEs.
MICRO-SCENARIO ANALYSIS
The team designed a micro-scenario to further examine the 
effect of the soldiers' SWC, the stress factor of the soldiers 
with strong impact on the soldiers' actual stress levels and 
behavior, on the MoE Number of Pacifying Actions by 
Soldiers. With a high stress level, the soldiers were 
overreacting very often. This result was considered highly 
unrealistic because the soldiers reached a maximum stress 
level even in situations with low escalation. A downscaled 
micro scenario was developed representing similar elements 
of the large-scale scenario above:
• 3 instead of 9 soldiers,
• 27 instead of 80 normal civilians,
• 20 instead of 60 cautious civilians,
• 6 instead of 20 aggressive civilians.
A situation with some escalation on a lower level was 
chosen. Choosing different sub-ranges for the SWC and 
comparing the outcomes, the system’s behavior analysis 
should  yield a reasonable parameter range. 
Figure 10 – Soldiers' stress level in 3 different micro runs
The SWC parameter was varied within the range of 
[0,30] since prior face validation showed that the upper range 
of values for the stress weighting constant produced 
unrealistically extreme behavior on the soldiers’ side. 
Particular interest was in the stress levels resulting from very 
low SWC values. All other parameters were kept constant. 
Figure 11 shows the resulting soldiers’ stress level of some 
significant single runs:
In such a low escalation situation, one would expect the 
soldiers to have a low to moderate level of stress, perhaps 
roughly 5% to 60% stress depending on the soldier position, 
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the duration of his exposure to the situation and the time at 
which the stress level is measured. 
The micro-experiment revealed a reasonable range of 
[3;25] for the SWC parameter for a realistic outcome. This 
range was very different than what we had used in our initial 
[0;100] and second [0;5] NOLH large-scale experiments.
Psychology roughly states an ideal performance by an 
individual being achieved with a stress level of 20% - 40% of 
maximum. But the team chose to calibrate SWC parameter to 
the range [3;25] due to the intention to calibrate the model to a 
highly realistic behavior and not to an optimal one that hardly 
is achievable.
OPTIMIZATION USING THE ART 
TOOL
The goal of applying ART’s (Automated Red Teaming, 
DSO National Laboratories, Singapore) optimization 
functionalities was to optimize selected MoEs towards subject 
matter experts' expected outcomes. It should be noted that 
ART was not used for its original purpose of red teaming. We 
rather used its implemented optimization algorithms on 
selected MoEs in order to find respective feasible input 
parameter settings. Table 2 shows the experiment setup with 
the large-scale initial settings in column 1. 
Parameters submitted to ART





Aggressives' Pers. Const. Anger 10-50 11-29
Aggressives' Readiness for Aggr. 30-100 57-99
Cautious' Pers. Const. Fear 10-50 19-44
Soldiers' Stress Factor 0-5 0.7-4.3
Aggressives' Pers. Const. Fear 30-100 36-77
Aggressives' Get many packages 90-100 91-96
Normals' Pers. Const. Anger 30-80 35-77
Cautious' Pers. Const. Anger 50-100 56-87
Table 2 - ART experiment search and optimized ranges
Column 2 lists the respective parameter ranges that lead 
to the target values in the selected MoEs as shown below. The 
considered MoEs comprised the number of packages 
distributed to each refugee group because there were pretty 
clear subject matter experts’ expectations for these outcomes. 
The target values that ART was given to optimize towards are 
displayed in Table 3, compared to the values achieved with 
ART.
Measure of Effectiveness Target Value Closest Value Achieved
# Packages distributed to 
civilians of aggressive group 20 22
# Packages distributed to 
civilians of cautious group 35 26
# Packages distributed to 
civilians of normal group 60 61
Table 3: Desired values towards which 
ART was set to optimize the scenario
Figure 11 displays these three MoEs (average over 10 
replications) for all  scenarios that ART produced after  the 4th 
generation of the SPEA2 evolutionary algorithm that was 
used, which had been configured to use an initial population 
size of 60, an archive size of 30 and a maximum of 8 
generations.
Figure 11 – MoEs of the scenarios calibrated using 
ART with PAX and the refugee camp scenario
Due to time limitations, only four generations could be 
performed and analyzed. But the results were already 
convincing. Figure 11 lists the results, the average MoEs were 
quite close to the target values. It is to be expected that the 
remaining generations of evolved scenarios will yield even 
better and more stable results in order to find input 
parameters settings that increase validity with respect to this 
particular scenario.
This simple exploration demonstrated that ART could be 
used as an optimization tool to calibrate PAX by adjusting 
input parameter settings to closely meet subject matter 
experts' expected outcomes of the scenario in selected MoEs.
CONCLUSION
The work at IFW17 helped a lot to understand some of 
the challenges in the process of calibration.  The Team gained 
valuable insights into how to use Data Farming for the 
calibration of agent-based simulation models. The utilized 
methods of large scale calibration, micro scenario analysis and 
ART optimization proofed to be useful and supplemented 
each other very well.
Macro scenarios help to identify relevant scenario 
parameters as well as realistic ranges for these parameters that 
shall be used in terms of analyzing simulation results. 
Simulating micro scenarios can supplement effectively in 
understanding and narrowing in on plausible value ranges of 
parameters. The applicability of the results of the calibration 
performed in micro scenarios need to be checked by feeding 
them back into the respective large-scale scenario. Besides 
that, it could be demonstrated that PAX can be used for 
analyses integrating the optimization framework ART from 
DSO Singapore. In doing this work, it was shown that ART 
can apply the implemented optimization functionalities 
outside of the originally intended red teaming purpose of the 
framework.
During the workshop, a preliminary approach for the 
process of calibrating an agent-based model like PAX was 
developed that, of course, needs to be further refined. But the 
first outcomes and findings are promising in a way, that it 
seems that even without the not-easy-to-get hard data 
(meaning empirically driven quantification of the relevant 
effects and outcomes of the model), a substantially increased 
quality of the model can be achieved by calibrating the model 
using this workshop's approach including using subject 
matter expertise and its related qualitative data. 
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Team 2: Peace Support Operations Model
TEAM 2 MEMBERS
Ed LESNOWICZ - Lead
Karl GUNZELMAN
Adam LARSON




For many years, even decades, military modeling and 
simulation has focused on physics-based models.  Ballistics 
patterns and electromagnetic sensing are an important part 
of modern warfare and can be understood well by the 
application of physics and engineering knowledge.   Many 
of the modeling environments commonly used by members 
of the international data farming community, such as 
MANA and Pythagoras, have been developed partly in 
response to this long-term phenomenon and the gap it has 
left with respect to other factors of equal or greater  import to 
the battlespace such as command and control and situational 
awareness.  As the challenges facing today’s militaries have 
increasingly tilted even further from the realm of physics 
and ballistics toward ever more human considerations such 
as winning hearts and minds in a counterinsurgency 
operation, modeling and simulation efforts have gradually 
followed.  Progress has been far from easy, so it is 
understandable that in the sixty years since the world’s last 
major naval battles so little progress has been made in 
modeling these “softer” factors in warfare.  One significant 
modeling effort at the center of this emerging trend is the 
Peace Support Operations Model, PSOM (pronounced 
“possum”) originally conceived and developed by the 
Defense Science and Technology Laboratory in the UK and 
now the subject of a joint UK-US development effort.
Peace Support Operations Model
PSOM was designed to be a turn-based interactive wargame. 
It supports multiple factions (e.g. regular militaries from 
various nations, civil government, insurgents of various 
stripes) which can each be controlled by human players 
operating independently based on the limited intelligence 
picture available to their specific force.  These factions 
compete for power and legitimacy with the local population, 
which may be as diverse as needed to model the real world 
realities (e.g. Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis in Iraq), each group 
with its own specific dispositions toward individual factions. 
The specific behavior of the model originates from UK and 
US counterinsurgency doctrine.  Progress toward self-
sustaining stability in a conflict area is measured in terms of 
security of the population, consent of the population to the 
various factions, state functionality (economy, development, 
and reconstruction), and fear of the population towards the 
factions.  Both military and civil courses of action are 
available, from the construction of power plants and 
administrative training to ambush attacks and IED 
emplacement.  The operational and strategic levels are 
intertwined with each operational decision having an effect 
on the civilian state variables.
Progress at IDFW 17
Since PSOM was conceived and developed as an interactive 
wargame with mostly deterministic relationships, its 
potential for data farming has been unclear.  The designers 
specifically decided against implementing a model designed 
a priori as a constructive simulation, believing that the 
human-in-the-loop wargame model made more sense and 
provided greater opportunities for insight.  On the technical 
level, it includes only a limited functionality for storing the 
results of previous games and re-running them in a batch 
mode and no direct control of the random seed used for the 
random elements of the model.
The task facing team 2 at the IDFW was to determine if 
PSOM would, despite the obstacles, be suitable for a data 
farming investigation.  Specifically, we were interested to see 
if the model could support NPS thesis work in the short term 
or if such efforts would have to be postponed.
 
Figure 1 – Variable Input in the GUI
To determine if the model was sufficiently developed for 
substantial statistical investigation we implemented a proof-
of-concept manual data farming effort, which we christened 
“data window gardening” due to its very limited scale.  We 
found that two variables we could easily vary with the 
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potential for interesting results were rules of engagement 
(RoE) and force protection (FP).  PSOM has five settings for 
each of these variables, from loose to tight for RoE and low to 
high for FP.  We chose a 32  fractional factorial design for a 
total of five design points.  Three replications per design 









Figure 2 – Design Points
Figure 3 – A Snapshot of the Output
For outputs from our window gardening, we selected 
two of the population variables towards which PSOM is most 
oriented: consent and security.  Specifically, we chose consent 
to coalition land forces in our notional counter-insurgency 
scenario, as it was coalition land’s force protection and RoE 
that we were varying.
Results
Attempt to fit a  bivariate linear model for consent showed 
non-linearity in the response.
More detailed analysis showed that the response to 
change in force protection was linear, but the response to 
change in RoE was nonlinear.  There was a stronger effect 
from changing loose to medium than from medium to tight. 
Changes to RoE had nominal effect on consent three times 
larger than force protection status.  The conclusion to be 
drawn from this would be that the population is more likely 
to do what you ask if you are not shooting and is less 
concerned with your defensive posture.
Figure 4 – Attempt to fit bivariate linear model
The regression for security proved to be linear in both 
RoE and force protection with RoE having twice the nominal 
influence as force protection.  Security levels decreased with 
tighter RoE and greater force protection.
The most important finding for team 2 was not any of our 
specific results but the verification that PSOM was, in fact, 
capable of generating results that appear interesting from a 
statistical standpoint.  Based on this, we concluded that PSOM 
was worthy of deeper exploration, and we look forward to 
updating the data farming community on our progress at 
IDFW 18.
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INTRODUCTION
Human Intangibles (HI) is a multifaceted and highly 
inconsistent element of Human factors. Because of the 
complexity and difficulties in modeling HI, many modelers 
have left out this aspect when carrying out studies and 
focused only on the more tangibles factors.  In some 
scenarios, these intangibles often play a greater role in 
deciding the battle outcome than other conventional factors 
like fire power, logistics, or mobility.  
OBJECTIVES   
Team HI had two key objectives for the IDFW 17 and both 
were accomplished: 
• Exploring HI and develop framework for HI modeling 
in MANA.
• Develop a scenario to test the framework.
EXPLORING HI IN MANA 
MANA is a user-friendly tool that can effectively model the 
effects of tangible factors. By applying input-modeling using 
the wide variety of parameters available, various tangible 
aspects of scenarios can be depicted.  However, there is a 
lack of input options to depict the HI characteristics. These 
characteristics are often essential factors that affect the 
outcome of the scenarios. To model HI in MANA, there is a 
need to assume the relationship between the HI factors and 
the model parameters.  For example, to model fear, modelers 
using MANA need to associate it with parameters such as 
speed and weapon accuracy.  In addition to this challenge, 
there is also the “tug of war” effect that needs to be 
addressed (to what degree will  different HI affect the same 
parameter they are associated with).  Even if the above can 
be accurately predicted, each outcome will need to be 
modeled as a different state. It will be almost impossible to 
model all possible relationships in MANA, using the finite 
number of trigger states available in MANA, when faced 
with a scenario that require multiple HI.
FRAMEWORK TO MODEL HI IN 
FUTURE VERSION OF MANA  
To further explore this, the team developed a framework to 
examine the effectiveness of using MANA for modeling HI. 
MANA can model the effects/outcomes due to individual HI 
by associating particular parameters with them. The team 
sought to identify which HI should be represented by which 
MANA parameters. As seen in fig. 1, the Blue portions are 
the existing capabilities in MANA, which are compared with 
the HI toolkit (Black box) to provide the inputs for MANA to 
generate the scenarios for Data Farming.  
• Defining of the Scenario.  The scenario for each study 
needs to be clearly defined and all HI factors required 
to be listed out. 
• Data Collection.   After all the HI factors in the 
scenario are considered, a study will need to be 
conducted to gather a set of physiological data.  For 
example, to gather the physiological data for the factor 
“Fatigue” on a patrol operation, a research on soldiers 
patrolling will be conducted to identify physiological 
findings such as sensing capability and reaction speed. 
The data collected will be consolidated, stored and 
extracted for subsequent uses.  
• Data Conversion.   The physiological data collected 
will then be converted to the inputs required by 
MANA.
• State Transition Diagram.   A squad of agents would 
take on a specific set of parameter settings, depending 
on the squad’s state.
Fig 1 - Draft Framework for Modeling HI in MANA
SCENARIOS DESCRIPTION  
A camp security scenario (See fig. 2) is modeled to test the 
framework in fig. 1.  The scenario modeled a patrol routine 
by a section of soldiers in 3 teams.  The MOE for the scenario 
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is the ability for the Blue patrol to stop all members of the 
Red intruder team of five from getting into the camp to 
sabotage the main building, by detonating explosives placed 
at the location marked by the white star. Four HI factors are 
modeled in the scenario and, for the ease of modeling, each 
HI factor is only associated with a single parameter in 
MANA.  The “maxima performance” effect was modeled in 
the scenario and all the Blue patrol agents would take on 
favorable levels for their various parameters when the Red 
force was detected (For example, the sensor capability of the 
Blue patrol agents are restored to the same state as that when 
the agents are fresh and wide-awake).
• Obedience.  This HI factor measures the obedience 
level of the soldier to the section commander.  This 
factor is associated with tendency to follow waypoint 
in his designated patrol route.
• Fatigue.   This factor measures the fatigue level of the 
soldier patrolling and is associated with the sensor 
capability.  The higher the fatigue level, the lower is 
the capability for the patrol to detect the Red 
intruders.
• Complacency.   This factor models the complacency 
level of the commander manning the CCTV.   The 
probability of detection of the CCTV is used to reflect 
this HI in the scenario.
• Ego.   This HI factor models the ego levelof the solider 
patrolling.  It is reflected in the scenario by the 
cohesiveness between the soldiers in the patrol team.   
Note that the choice of parameter associated to each HI is 
selected based on our team consensus during IDFW17. After 
the workshop, we will verify with the military psychologists 
and operational users the appropriateness of these 
parameters.
Fig 2 - Camp Security Scenario
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
2^4 full factorial runs, which depicted all combinations of 
the 4  parameters each set at 2  levels, were carried out on 
MANA. Then JMP1  was used to calculate the effects on the 
proportion of runs that the Red intruders were successful in 
sabotaging the main building.  The bar-chart below 
illustrates the effect due to various parameters, which in turn 
represents the four HI that are being studied.
!
Effects






Fig 3 - Bar-chart for effect on Red intrusion success proportion
Obedience is a  very significant factor.   By allowing the 
Blue patrol agents to deviate from their assigned routes, there 
are chances that more than one Blue patrol squad can contact 
the team of Red intruders that are entering the camp, or at 
least be of closer proximity to response to the call for support 
by the commander manning the CCTV. The addition fire 
power greatly increased the chances of stopping all the Red 
intruders. On the contrary, should the Blue patrol squads be 
religiously following the assigned routes, which were 
designed such that all 3 patrol squads are evenly spread apart, 
it is almost certain that in all cases only one squad contacts the 
Red intruders. The other patrol squads would not have 
enough time to respond to the call for support before the 
survivor(s) from the Red team are successful in sabotaging the 
main building.
Fatigue has negligible influence on the results.   Recall 
that the “maxima performance” effect was modeled in the 
scenario. The degrading in the sensor capability to detect the 
Red intruders results in a few seconds delay before the first 
detection of the Red intruders. This slight delay is deemed to 
be insignificant as there was sufficient time for the fire-fight 
to the last man to break out, the end state that decides the 
success of the red sabotage mission.
Complacency has slight influence on the Red success. As 
discussed above, even if the commander were able to detect 
the Red intruders, the success of the various patrol teams to 
close in on the intruders is very much dependent on the 
distance from the intruders, which is more related to the 
obedience factor.
Ego has slight influence on the Red success. The 
cohesiveness between the agents in each patrol squad affects 
the local sphere of detection around the squad. This factor has 
only a slight effect on the chance of detection of the Red 
intruders, which is not of much influence to the Red success 
probability, as there was sufficient time for the fire-fight to 
carry out to completion as described above.
The results revealed some possible improvements that 
we could make to the patrolling route, in order to increase the 
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1 JMP is a statistical software for expert data analysis, DOE and Six Sigma, from SAS (Statiscal Analysis Software).  
Visit http://www.jmp.com/ for further detail.
likelihood of stopping the Red intruders. We can further 
explore how randomness can be incorporated into the 
patrolling route. One suggestion is to allow the soldiers to 
choose their patrolling routes. The commander will  only 
provide the patrolling soldiers with minimal instruction (such 
as selected locations and time that they must reach these 
locations) and the soldiers are empowered to decide how 
they plan to cover these locations within the specified 
timeframe. This procedure will ensure that critical locations 
are patrolled and also provide some flexibility to the soldier’s 
patrolling pattern.
CONCLUSION 
Based on the implementation of the camp security scenario, 
we found that MANA has both advantages and limitations 
in a HI study. The various groups of stakeholders have 
different ideas on what HI means and the types of HI to be 
included in the study. We realized that a simple simulation 
model can help to facilitate discussion among the 
operational users. The model also allowed a demonstration 
of a possible new dimension to traditional military models.
We would like to clarify that the MANA is not necessarily 
meant to model HI and our intention here was to explore the 
extent that MANA can be used in a HI study. Bearing this in 
mind, we assess that current version of MANA lacks the 
ability to:
Take into account how the HI may change over the 
simulation.
Model the interactions between multiple HI and their 
effects on parameters in MANA.
The following example will illustrate these points. 
Obedience and fatigue may have opposite effects on the 
waypoint that the patrolling soldiers take. At the beginning of 
his duty, an obedient soldier will follow the instruction and 
patrol strictly along the assigned route. However, as the 
fatigue level of the soldier increases over time, it is more likely 
that he may take a shortcut and skip certain portions of the 
assigned route. In addition, the level of obedience will also 
have an effect on the fatigue threshold level before a soldier 
starts to take shortcut. 
During the workshop, we had the opportunity to talk to 
other participants about our team study and discuss about the 
feasibility of modeling HI in various agent-based simulation 
tools, in particular PAX and Pythagoras. Through these 
interactions, we observed some desirable characteristics in 
these tools. 
These tools have “stock” levels to model the change of 
HI over time. Apart from this capability, they have simple 
mathematical functions to facilitate how various HI can affect 
the agent’s behavior. For example, if we implement the camp 
security scenario in these models, the function will decide 
whether a soldier will take a shortcut, depending on the 
current level of HI factors. These features will be useful to 
model the interactions among HI factors.
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
The team will use the camp security scenario to kick start a 
HI study with Ops User to test the framework developed by 
the team.  The study will allow the team to fine tune the 
framework for HI studies using Agent Based Simulation 
(ABS).  Insights gained in the study will either assist the 
development of a “HI” version of MANA or create a totally 
new ABS model to look into HI aspects of interest.
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The German Federal Office of Defense Technology and 
Procurement (BWB) is interested in analyzing the influence 
of networked sensors and effectors on military capabilities in 
network centric operations (NCO). Former studies showed, 
however, that the existing agent-based models are rather 
limited in terms of modeling and simulating complex 
technical systems on a sound physical basis. 
For this reason, the BWB started developing a new agent-
based model that aims to fulfill the requirements to be used 
for analyzing the combination of various sensor and effector 
systems in NCO and taking into account underlying physical 
theories. A first prototype of this model (ABSEM version 0.1) 
was presented to the International Data Farming Community 
at IDFW17.
ABSEM Overview
The goal of ABSEM (Agent-based Sensor-Effector Model) is 
to design and establish a powerful agent-based tool for 
sensor-effector simulations on the technical and tactical level 
that can be used for high performance experimentation on 
the German Supercomputing / Data Farming cluster. 
ABSEM concentrates on modeling the technical aspects in 
NCO, with the main focus on sensor and effector systems. For 
this reason, ABSEM integrates detailed physical theories when 
it comes to simulating the output of various sensors and when 
determining the effect of different weapon systems. 
ABSEM version 0.1  mainly concentrates on modeling 
electro-optical sensors, including the "normal" human view, 
infrared devices and residual light amplifier.
As input data the sensors evaluate information about the 
background, information about the target itself, but also 
atmospheric conditions. The sensors' output is a list of 
perceived entities in the agent's field of view, along with the 
information if the target entity was detected, classified or even 
identified.
Objectives
The ABSEM implementation was only started in 2008, thus 
version 0.1 provides basic functionalities for modeling 
sensor and effector systems in NCO. The goal of the Data 
Farming experiments in the camp protection scenario was to 
scrutinize the ABSEM approaches implemented so far.
Overall, the team had the following goals:
• Review and face validate the first ABSEM prototype 
version 0.1.
• Conduct data farming experiments using common 
data farming tools.
• Identify needs for further work.
• Gain insight into other models (participation in 
plenary sessions).
Scenario
Using a camp protection scenario, the team's objective was to 
investigate the effect of different electro-optical sensor 
systems (human view, short wave, middle wave and long 
wave infrared) within a dynamic environment.
Figure 1: Scenario Camp Protection
The IDFW17 scenario deals with the threat posed by 
micro-light aerial vehicles. The military camp is protected by 
several watch towers occupied with soldiers equipped with 
the electro-optical  sensors mentioned above. The sentry 
reports any detected, classified or identified unit to the 
command center, which, in turn, decides how to proceed. 
Depending on the scenario setup (and the user-defined agent 
behavior), the own forces will fight the detected micro-light 
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planes as soon as they were classified or wait for an 
identification (to reduce fratricide due to false interpretation).
TEAM ACTIVITIES
The team's main intention during IDFW17 was to investigate 
the effect of different electro-optical sensor systems. 
Therefore we examined different devices with either 
reflection- or temperature-based vision (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Different types of sensors
In several data farming experiments the different sensors' 
validity was checked. To ease things, the scenario described 
above was further simplified (see Figure 3).
In our scenario, we examined the sensor's performance 
for different approach corridors for the hostile micro-light 
plane.
By doing so, we could analyse the effect of different 
terrain features.
Figure 3: Simplified base case scenario
Data Farming Experiments
After some preliminary experiments and looking at single 
simulation runs to get familiar with the model and its user 
interfaces, three different data farming experiments were 
performed.
In the first experiment we distinguished between day 
and night, thus varying the parameters for the illuminance 
and the temperatures of the target object and the background.
In the second experiment we had a look at different levels 
of attenuation. Thus representing the whole bandwidth from 
excellent to very bad weather conditions, that is from clear sky 
to dense fog.
Finally, we convinced ourselves, that the detailed 
physical ABSEM sensor delivers more realistic perception 
probabilities than a simple, purely probability based sensor. In 
a third experiment we equipped the observer either with a 
detailed optical sensor or with a very simple and abstract 
sensor (comparable to the one implemented in MANA).
Data Farming Results
In all three experiments we were looking at the distance in 
which the target object could be detected, classified or 
identified to measure the sensor's performance (plotted 
against the y-axis).
In the first experiment regarding the sensor performance 
during day and at night, we got the results we expected: the 
lower the illuminance, the worse the perception.
Figure 4: Experiment 1 - distinction between day and night
In the second experiment, the results were also quite 
obvious, which confirmed our sensor modeling approach: the 
higher the attenuation (that is the worse the weather 
conditions), the later the hostile entity was perceived.
Figure 5: Experiment 2 – different weather conditions
Finally, with the third experiment, we simply wanted to 
demonstrate that the detailed physical modeling approach in 
fact results in much more realistic behavior. We compared a 
very simply modeled sensor with our detailed physical 
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optical sensor. Since the simple sensor does not distinguish 
between different weather conditions or different times of the 
day, the detection distance was constant, of course (see Figure 
6).
Figure 6: Experiment 3 – simple and abstract sensor returns 
constant detection distance irrespective of different weather 
conditions or times of the day
Using the detailed physical optical sensors, by contrast, 
allows us to get much more reliable and realistic results. And 
that is essential when using ABSEM for analyzing the 
influence of complex technical systems (especially networked 
sensors and effectors) on military capabilities and the 
operational outcome.
Summary
The team's main intention was to review the first model 
prototype ABSEM v 0.1 (focussing on optical sensors).
We could show that the physical sensor modelling 
approach we have chosen seems to be very promising. With 
the implemented optical sensors, the terrain features and 
atmospheric conditions are adequately considered.
Furthermore, we also succeeded in conducting data 
farming experiments using the Data Farming GUI. We were 
successfully running our experiments within a feasible 
amount of time on the German cluster (ABSEM currently runs 
significantly faster-than-realtime1). 
Overall we were able to confirm that we are on the right 
way!
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Modern warfare is characterized by the use of combined 
arms where various types of forces come together to fight as 
a single entity, as a system-of-systems. Typically, for land 
forces, system-of-systems are battalion level and above. In 
this workshop, the terrain that was selected to be studied is 
the urban terrain. The team’s objective was to explore the 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of the defender 
operating in an urban terrain. The specific aim was to 
determine how the defender should locate his defensive 
positions and also how he should deploy his reserves. The 
scenario map was developed by the DSO National 
Laboratories, Singapore.
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
The scenario examined during the workshop was a battalion 
attack of a company plus defended urban locality. The 
defender deploys a section and a platoon plus of 
mechanized infantry at the forward positions each along the 
3 main axes. A company minus sized mechanized infantry 
reserve organized into 2 echelons is held at the rear to 
reinforce the forward positions. The entire defence is 
supported by a mortar platoon providing support fire. The 
green rectangles are obstacles emplaced in the defended 
locality. The defender’s defence is as shown in Figure 1 
below:
Figure 1: Defence Plan
The attacker inserts a platoon sized block force to the depth and 
advances along 2 axes with a company of mechanized infantry each, 
holding a company minus mechanized infantry as the reserve that 
will be activated upon breaking through either axes. The attack is 
supported by an artillery battery and a UAV. The attack plan is as 
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Attack Plan
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
For the defensive positions, 3 concepts are studied:
• Forward – This is where the defender pushes all his static 
forces to the front positions.
• Depth – This is  where the defender locates all his forces at 
the rear of the operating area.
• Mixed – The defender deploys his forces uniformly 
along the axes.
For the reinforcement routes,  3 concepts are studied:
• No reserve – No reserves, all forces are deployed at 
the static defence positions.
• Frontal –  The reserves are deployed “head-on” with 
the direction of the attacker.
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• Flanking –  The reserves comes from the flanks of the 
attacker.
Figure 3 below shows how the defender deploys his 
forces according to the concepts mentioned above:
Figure 3: Design of Experiments – Defender Concepts of Defence
These various combinations of static forces and reserves 
make up for a total of 3x3 = 9 combinations of tactics that the 
defender can employ. A total of 10 replicates are made for each 
of the combination of static and reserve employment concept.
The measure of effectiveness (MOE) used in this study 
during this workshop is the Force Exchange Ratio (FER). In 
this study, for the defender, the smaller this MOE, the better.
RESULTS
Figure 4: Analysis for deployment of static forces
From Figure 4 above, we can see that a mixed 
deployment strategy produces the smallest mean Force 
Exchange Ratio. In addition, from the box plot in Figure 4, we 
can see that the variation of outcome for a mixed deployment 
strategy is the smallest among the 3 concepts. 
Figure 5: Analysis for deployment of reserves.
From Figure 5 above, we can see that deploying reserves 
to the flanks of the attacker produces the smallest mean Force 
Exchange Ratio. In addition, the variation of the battle 
outcome for a flanking manoeuvre is also the smallest.
Figure 6: Combined Analysis 
From Figure 6 above and together with the analysis done 
previously, we can see that employing a mixed deployment 
strategy and deploying the reserves to the flanks of the 
attacker is the most optimal and also robust combination for 
the defender in the urban terrain.
CONCLUSION
The results obtained from workshop provided interesting 
insights on how tactics and doctrine can be evaluated and 
validated using data farming techniques. The results suggest 
that for the defender, the best tactic would be to spread his 
forces along main axes of movement and have the reserves 
reinforce from the flanks of the attacker. By spreading his 
forces along the main axes, he would be able to reduce his 
vulnerability to the attacker’s artillery fires. In addition, by 
deploying his reserves from the flanks, the defender would 
be able to avoid a head-on fire fight with the attacker. The 
reserves would engage in decisive combat with the attacker 
only when they arrive at the position to be reinforced. 
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INTRODUCTION - TEAM 6
The goal of Team 6 activities at IDFW 17 was to conduct a 
capability evaluation strategy refinement process for testing in 
a joint environment (TIJE).  These activities were supported by 
a prototyped automated capability test methodology (CTM) 
evaluation thread builder and agent-based simulation (ABS) 
tools developed by Joint Test and Evaluation Methodology 
(JTEM).  The use case scenario for this data farming team 
exercise was based on a  command and control (C2) joint 
capability area (JCA), focused on joint fires (JFIRES) and close 
air support (CAS) mission task threads developed as part of a 
JTEM 2008 test event.  An ABS model was written in Visual 
Basic as part of an Excel spreadsheet designed to model both 
Blue and Red agents in a limited joint mission environment. 
The model allowed flexibility to consider materiel and non-
materiel  factors in the design of experiment (DOE) that 
focused on C2 processes and decisions.  The exit criteria for 
the team included planning a C2 critical capability issue 
evaluation strategy design, exercising the evaluation strategy 
using an ABS, and conducting an initial capability analysis of 
the evaluation strategy at mission and task levels.  This effort 
explored the use of automated capability analysis and 
simulation tools for TIJE by JTEM and its partners.  Specific 
objectives for Team 6 at IDFW 17 were:
• Conduct a capability evaluation strategy refinement 
process for TIJE
• Prototype an automated CTM evaluation thread 
builder and ABS tool
• Utilize a “use case” scenario based on a C2 JCA, 
focused on JFIRES and CAS mission task threads 
developed as part of a JTEM 2008 test event
• Consider materiel and non-materiel factors in the DOE 
process 
• Evaluate methods for analysis of factors across 
multiple measures
Approach
The overall approach for our C2 capability evaluation 
exploration involved applying CTM 0.3 Develop Evaluation 
Strategy processes to recommend refinements for capability-
focused test and evaluation (T&E) designs (see Figure 1). 
After identifying and collecting evaluation inputs relevant to 
the case study's capability concepts (CTM 0.3.1), a critical 
capability issue was developed (CTM 0.3.2) to structure an 
iterative exploration of the case study's design space, which 
occurred as part of establishing the use case's T&E strategy 
framework (CTM 0.3.3).  This iterative exploration involved a 
cycle of developing and refining efficient DOE metamodels, 
exercising these metamodels with an ABS model, and 
conducting analysis on selected ABS simulation response 
measures.
Figure 1.  CTM 0.3 Develop Evaluation Strategy Processes
The use case critical capability issue is shown in Figure 
2.  The phrasing is a reflection of this definition of capability: 
The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified 
standards and conditions through combinations of means 
and ways to perform a set of tasks (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007).  We used a critical joint issue template 
of "Assess the ability to perform [Task(s)] by [System(s)/
System of System(s)] under the following [Condition(s)] to 
achieve [Mission Desired Effect(s)].”  Key concepts in this 
capability-centric issue phrasing include task, system of 
systems (SoS), condition (threat and environment), and 
mission desired effect.
Based on this critical capability issue, a  joint operational 
context for test (JOC-T) was developed using key capability 
concepts.  An overview of this capability JOC-T is shown in 
Figure 3 as a DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) High 
Level Operational Graphic (OV-1) product.  The OV-1 has 
three main sections.
The upper part represents an SoS means and ways 
implementation across materiel  and non-materiel aspects. 
The icons represent various performers and the lines represent 
interaction types relevant to this particular capability 
assessment.  SoS Sensor, C2, Global Information Grid network 
infrastructure, and Engagers are represented.  Threat air  and 
ground targets are also represented.  Lines between SoS 
performers are communication interactions.  Lines between 
SoS and threat performers are sensing and engagement 
interactions.
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The middle part of the OV-1 represents the tasks that the 
SoS is to perform.  In this case, two joint tasks are represented 
in task swimlanes with a top-level activity sequence chain. 
Both Conduct Joint Fires and Conduct Close Air  Support have 
similar chains involving Detect, Identify, Decide, Deconflict, 
Deliver, and Assess activities.  Of course, each activity chain 
has its own set of performers in a SoS implementation.
The lower part of the OV-1 represents an intended 
mission desired effect to be achieved by the SoS performing 
the set of tasks.  The mission desired effect is threat platform 
(air and ground) ineffectiveness.
Taking the use case critical joint issue and JOC-T, an 
initial T&E design space was created involving DOE 
dependent variable measures and independent variable 
factors.  The use case measures were based on the CTM's 
measures framework shown on the left side of Figure 4.  The 
measures framework has three levels of measures: Mission 
Measure of Effectiveness (MMOE), Task Measure of 
Performance (TMOP), and Measure of System/System of 
Systems Attribute (MOSA).  These measures relate to the 
definition of capability in the following ways.  MMOEs 
measure the ability to achieve mission desired effects.  TMOPs 
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Figure 2.  Use Case Critical Joint Issue
Figure 3.  Team 6 Use Case High Level Operational Graphic (OV-1)
measure task performance.  MOSAs measure system-level 
and SoS-level performance attributes across the materiel and 
non-materiel aspects of an SoS implementation.  MOSAs can 
involve system-level effectiveness and suitability measures.
Multiple dependent variable measures were developed at 
each level as shown on the right side of Figure 4.  The MMOEs 
focused on threat system combat ineffectiveness by counting 
threat kills and calculating cumulative ineffectiveness time of 
threat systems in the joint operations area (JOA).  The TMOPs 
calculate various times of C2 activities within joint close air 
support (JCAS) task and JFIRES task kill chains.  The MOSAs 
were focused on non-materiel C2 personnel attribute 
performance relating to call for fire (CFF) deconfliction and 
decision procedures.
ABS Model and Scenario
Legacy ABSs that have been used in previous IDFW 
workshops did not simulate C2 processes very effectively 
nor include non-materiel factors in the evaluation strategy. 
To include these characteristics in an ABS model required the 
development of one by the JTEM Operations Research team. 
The result was an Excel-based model that simulated friendly 
and threat units in a JOA that resulted in direct and indirect 
fires. Direct fires occurred by ground units that were capable 
of moving, sensing, and shooting, and that did not require a 
CFF process to clear an airspace with a joint force.  Indirect 
fires occurred when ground units with no firing capability or 
air units with firing capability sensed a target.  Indirect fires 
required a CFF process to clear an airspace.
The ABS model was able to simulate the C2 steps 
associated with the CFF process (See Figure 5).
Macal and North (2006) state a fundamental feature of an 
agent is the ability to make independent decisions; be active 
rather than purely passive.  The friendly and threat units in 
this ABS model actively engaged each other following a series 
of procedural rules and variation of seventeen different SoS 
and conditional factors that include materiel attributes and 
non-materiel doctrinal procedures.  Figure 6 displays the 
capability crosswalk matrix with categorical and continuous 
factor levels used in the model.  To simplify the experimental 
design, each factor was assigned two levels or values in 
which to evaluate their impact.  Some level of complexity did 
exist with dependencies among multiple factors.  For 
example, the value of factor 12 (Restricted Operating Zone 
[ROZ] slack time) had no impact if factor 11 (ROZ expiration) 
was set at “no”.  In this case, the solution was to treat the two 
factors as one factor with three levels:
• ROZ expiration with slack time of one
• ROZ expiration with slack time of two
• No ROZ expiration
Figure 5.  Call For Fires (CFF) Process
One other dependency existed with the presence of a 
civilian zone, factors 15–17.  This three-factor dependency 
needed to be treated as one combined factor with five levels. 
The implications of these multi-level factors will become 
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Figure 4.  CTM Dependent Variable Response Levels and Use Case Measures
apparent in the follow-on discussion of the experimental 
designs used in the workshop.
Figure 6.  Factor Capability Crosswalk
The scenario consisted of a joint forcible entry mission 
where threat forces hindered the ability to expand lodgment 
and control key infrastructure in order to facilitate rapid force 
build-up in the JOA.  One desired effect to mission 
effectiveness included destroyed or neutralized threat forces. 
The desired joint capability was an ability to efficiently 
command and control indirect fires of Joint Close Air Support 
(JCAS) and Joint Fires (JFIRES) tasks.  This was considered to 
be the SoS under test.
The seventeen modeled factors were the independent 
variables to the model.  Dependent variables consisted of 
multiple measures that follow the JTEM evaluation strategy to 
evaluate joint mission effectiveness, task performance, and 
key SoS attributes.  Each level of measures was important to 
the evaluation of the joint capability when integrated into a 
joint mission environment.  Figure 4 identifies the three levels 
of measures and the specific measures that were evaluated 
within the ABS model.
First Iteration: C2 Issue Resolution III “Quick 
Look” Exploration
Our first iteration was to do a "quick look" analysis of the 
capability space using a resolution III fractional factorial 
design at two levels, with an additional five-level DOE 
crossing factor (Civilian Zone).  While resolution III designs 
can explore a large number of factors with a relatively small 
number of runs, they confound main effects with two-factor 
interactions (Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 1978).  Therefore, we 
could not estimate main effects separately from two-factor 
interactions, but could get an indication of factors which had 
main effect or two-way factor significance.
The first iteration resolution III DOE was:
which used a 15 two-level factor design crossed with 
Civilian Zone as a five-level factor.
The threat systems combat ineffectiveness MMOE was 
initially analyzed using a full main effects fit as shown in 
Figure 7.  The left hand column shows Xs indicating subject 
matter expert (SME) estimates of which factors have 
important effects concerning the threat systems combat 
ineffectiveness MMOE.  Blue Speed (two speed levels), ROZ 
Type (Restricted or Permissive level), GIG (On or Off), and 
Blue Fires (two range levels) were estimated as the four most 
important factors.  In the first iteration resolution III DOE 
runs, the four factors estimated as important were all 
statistically significant with p-values (Prob> [t]) of less than .
05.  Factors which did not provide indications of significance 
are candidates to reduce the DOE factor space in the next 
iteration of analysis.  Based on our first iteration "quick look", 
we reduce the Civilian Zone factor levels from five to three, 
since varying Civilian Zone location did not have a significant 
effect.  We also gained insights about which factors in the 
design space had indications of main or two-way significance. 
A surprise was that the No Adverse Weather factor level 
indicated a negative, main/two-way effect on the MMOE, 
which is non-intuitive and required further investigation in 
subsequent iterations.
Figure 7.  First Iteration "Quick Look" 
Resolution III Full Main Effects Fit
First Iteration: Exploring Multiple Measures
As a secondary objective in the first analysis iteration, we 
wanted to investigate techniques for analyzing results across 
multiple measures.  One method is to review results for each 
measure and then construct a relationship table to evaluate 
which factors impact which measures.  Figure 8 displays the 
results for the main effects on each of the mission measures 
of effectiveness, task measures of performance, and 
measures of SoS attributes as shown in the yellow squares. 
Squares where there are zeros indicates “no significant 
impact” based on the factor response. Squares with positive 
or negative one values indicates a positive or negative 
“significant impact on the measure.  Two way interactions 
across measures are seen in the right-hand columns.  Those 
squares with a green background represent a direct 
relationship across the two relevant measures while those 
with a red background represent an indirect relationship. 
Those squares with a zero again do not appear to have a 
relationship.  This provides us insights on factors that are 
significant across multiple measures.  In our results, we 
observe that every factor has the same impact on both of the 
MMOEs.  We also see the factors Blue Monitor, Multiple 
Trackers, and ROZ Slack Time each have a positive impact on 






















Full Main Effects Fit:
every measure.  A third observation is that the factors CFF 
Type of Decision and ROZ Expiration influence the TMOPs 
and MOSAs in a different direction from the MMOEs.  We 
may draw a conclusion that these five factors may be 
significantly important for follow-on analysis.
Figure 8.  Measures Relationship
Second Iteration: C2 Issue Resolution V Main 
Effect and Two Way Interaction Exploration
As a second analysis iteration, we used a resolution V 
fractional factorial design at two levels.  When simulation 
resources and time allow the increased number of runs, 
resolution V designs are preferred over resolution III 
designs, since the higher resolution designs do not confound 
main effects and two-factor interactions (Box, Hunter, & 
Hunter).  Resolution V designs allowed us to separately 
assess main effect and two way interactions using a stepwise 
regression model of response measures.
The second iteration resolution V DOE was:
which used 12 two-level factors crossed with Civilian Zone 
and ROZ Expiration as 3-level factors.
The threat systems combat ineffectiveness MMOE was 
again used for second iteration analysis for factor significance. 
Classification and Regression Tree (CART) partitioning and 
stepwise regression models were used to identify factor main 
and two-way effects.  The second iteration CART is shown in 
Figure 9 with the partitioning of factor levels producing 
"good" MMOE responses (larger threat attrition counts) on the 
left side and "bad" MMOE responses (smaller threat attrition 
counts) on the left side.  The CART shows five levels of 
partitions to indicate the most significant factor partitions. 
Good factor levels of high Blue Speed, small ROZ size (1), and 
permissive ROZ type produce an MMOE mean attrition of 
~42.  Good factor levels of high Blue Speed (2), small  ROZ size 
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Figure 10.  Second Iteration Resolution V Stepwise Regression Fit
Figure 9.  Second Iteration Classification and Regression Tree (CART)
(1), and permissive ROZ type produced an MMOE mean 
attrition of ~42.  At the other end of this MMOE effect 
spectrum, bad factor levels of low Blue Speed (1) and large 
ROZ size (2) produced an MMOE mean attrition of ~21.
The second iteration analysis also included a stepwise 
regression fit incorporating main and two-factor interactions 
as shown in Figure 10.  The left hand column shows the 
mapping of SME factor importance estimates to the significant 
(p-value < .05) regression fits for the threat systems combat 
ineffectiveness MMOE.  One surprise was that the Blue Fires 
was significant as a two-factor interaction with ROZ type, not 
as a main effect.  Another surprise was the number of 
significant two-factor interactions with ROZ Type, indicating 
second order effects between this non-materiel doctrine factor 
and other factors.  Based on our second iteration analysis, we 
identified important decision factor, supporting decision and 
condition factor recommendations to further reduce the 
design space.  Our approach was to combine key supporting 
decision and condition factor levels into a "meta" stressing 
factor which varied factor levels in the same "good" and "bad" 
MMOE directions.  The factors selected for this stressing 
factor are further discussed in the third iteration analysis 
section.
Third Iteration: C2 Issue Refined Design with 
Stressing Factor Exploration
In the previous steps, a set of lower priority factors were 
determined and set at levels that resulted in high and low 
stress levels (high and low values in the measure). As a  third 
analysis iteration, we again used a resolution V fractional 
factorial design at two levels with nine of the original factors 
and a tenth factor that consisted of the remaining five factors 
set at most stressing and least stressing levels.  This tenth 
factor is considered a “conditional”  factor in that each single 
factor represents conditions in the physical environment or 
conditions in the doctrinal environment.  
The third iteration resolution V DOE was:
which used nine two-level factors and a tenth most/least 
stressing factor.
The team applied CART analysis output with the 
stressing factors set at their stressing levels.  The result was 
the stressing factor becoming the most statistically significant 
factor.  The best response to the dependent variable was 
achieved when the stressing factor was set at its least level 
combination along with Blue speed, CFF Type of Decision, 
and ROZ type set at desired levels.  The results can be seen in 
Figure 11 with a least squares regression indicating those most 
significant factors.   This implies the original 17 factors can 
now be reduced to a set of three materiel factors, three non-
materiel  factors, and one stressing factor, each with two levels. 
These results could then be presented to SMEs as 
recommendations for prioritizing factors that may be explored 
in future live, virtual, and constructive test and evaluation.
Figure 11: Stressing Level Results
Discoveries and Surprises
Our main discoveries during IDFW 17 related to key 
refinements of the CTM's 0.3  Develop Evaluation Strategy 
focus process.  These refinements included promising 
automation for developing evaluation strategy measures and 
factors from critical operational issue and capability 
crosswalk constructs.  Also, the generation of resolution V 
designs for our hybrid sets of continuous and categorical 
factors proved very useful.  These resolution V designs were 
generated using Sanchez & Sanchez (2005) fractional 
factorial composite designs.
Our team discovered surprises related to our capability 
exploration and our team dynamics in IDFW 17.  While SME 
factor estimates proved to be significant, we were surprised at 
the number and composition of two-factor interactions.  Some 
of the factors in the significant two factor interactions did not 
have corresponding main effects, which would increase the 
need to explore level interactions in further test excursions, 
such as live, virtual, and constructive test events.
Conclusions
IDFW 17 enabled us to derive conclusions concerning the 
relevance of data farming techniques to the CTM 0.3 
Develop Evaluation Strategy process.  Resolution V and 
crossing design are examples of preferred DOE techniques 
needed for assessing main effect and two-way interactions 
for hybrid capability sets of categorical and continuous 
factors.  Initial low resolution DOE and data farming may 
provide first insights into significant measures.  These 
insights may differ across multiple measures and require 
retaining uncertain factors in the subsequent designs. 
Iterative farming can provide additional prioritization of 
factors.  Factors with more than two discrete levels require 
additional farming to assess their impact.    Multiple 
measures (dependent variables) add significant complexity 
to determining factors with highest impact.  This requires 
evaluation of factors across multiple dependent variables 
(measures) by constructing relationship tables that provide 
insights on measure impacts.
Additional conclusions can be made related to 
effectiveness and suitability of the CTM.  Exploratory analysis 
requires an iterative process that is consistent and repeatable 
for prioritizing factors.  In this workshop, a set of factors were 
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set at most and least stressing levels to compose one stressing 
factor.  This allowed for a smaller  set of factors that result in 
less requirements and resources for future testing.  Alternative 
steps may be available for prioritizing factors.  Automated 
tools for DOE and modeling can help to simplify the 
exploratory analysis process.  Non-materiel factors can be 
equally important to testing an SoS.
Issues for Further Investigation
We anticipate further exploration and refinement of 
the CTM evaluation thread processes during future 
IDFW events.  This exploration includes the 
refinement of capability assessment structures and 
efficient DOE techniques, such as composite fractional 
factorials are key focus areas for further exploration 
and automation.  Additional excursions may be made 
on the process for prioritizing test factors which can 
lead to a consistent and repeatable methodology for 
testing SoS in a joint mission environment.
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OVERVIEW
Team 7 was not a traditional IDFW team.  Work in the 
area of modeling PMESII is nascent and this team was a 
“discussion” team, designed to begin the discourse on the 
value of various models and potential data farming that may 
impact upon PMESII questions.  From this perspective, it was 
a successful workshop for Team 7.
It was successful from many facets that are not always 
obvious in such a technical workshop.  Specific to team 7, the 
smaller individual team format allowed for very focused 
discussion and while team 7’s novelty allowed team 
members time for cross pollination of ideas and discussion by 
visiting other teams during their work.  It is worthwhile to 
note that the relationships are as important as the tasks 
themselves and need continued nurturing.  The workshop 
format ensured success via the focus group discussion that 
encouraged cross talk and relationship building.
In addition to building knowledge and relationships, 
Team 7 had three noteworthy “potential” successes. 
1. NPS is evaluating using the Peace Support 
Operations Model (PSOM) methodology as a 
standard for M&S assessment.  They are also 
assessing the potential to standup an international 
M&S test-bed.
2. The Singapore contingent is going to review our 
PMESII community listing and add Asian 
stakeholders that would be interested in helping us 
expand.  They are also going to assess if developing 
a scenario to stress the community in future 
experimentation is within national interest.
3. Team 6 is going to evaluate the possibility of using 
their tools and analytical methodologies to help 
with the experimentation analysis for  the subject 
community.
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Figure 1 – Group Members
INTRODUCTION
Our team adapted an existing computer model that 
simulates activities of the human immune system for use in 
the workshop’s data farming setting.  A group at The Ohio 
State University College of Medicine developed the model, 
the Basic Immune Simulator (BIS).1  The BIS is an agent-
based model that simulates aspects of the human immune 
system, in particular, the interaction between innate and 
adaptive immunity.  Three general components involved in 
the human immune response are represented in the model:
• Normal human functional tissue cells.
• Entities which attempt to invade and overwhelm 
normal cells (attackers).
• Elements of the immune system which attempt to 
defend against these attackers (defenders). 
One or more agent types are defined to represent 
elements of each component.  Parenchymal agents represent 
normal tissue cells.  Various attacker agent types represent 
viruses, bacteria, and abnormal human cells that attack 
“self” (such as cancer and auto-immune phenomena). 
Defender agent types represent elements of the innate 
immune sub-system (including macrophages, dendritic cells, 
natural killer cells, neutrophils, and granulocytes), as well as 
elements of the adaptive immune sub-system (including T-
cells, both helper and cytotoxic, and B-cells).  The model 
simultaneously simulates activity at three sites in the human 
body:
• Parenchymal Tissue – the site of the attack/infection.
• Lymph nodes – the site where defenders proliferate.
• Circulatory system (lymphatic and blood) – the site 
through which defenders are transported.
The BIS is open source and is implemented in Java using 
the Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit (Repast).2
GOALS
Our goals going into IDFW 17 were modest.  We wanted to 
modify the existing BIS model only to the extent that we 
would be able to data farm it using OldMcData3  in 
conjunction with Condor4 on a cluster of processors.  This 
process required two software development efforts.  The first 
was to modify the code to allow the model to read input 
parameters from an XML file.  The second was to have the 
model output the results of its runs to a CSV file.  We also 
realized that we needed to invest some effort modifying the 
code to more gracefully handle a certain exception condition. 
The condition, which caused the Java process to exhaust its 
stack space, occurred relatively frequently and was due to 
the model entering a state that the model authors termed 
“immune hyper-response”.  The model authors maintain 
that this is a valid immune system state and is “due to 
exponentially increasing numbers of lymphocyte agents due 
to forward feedback”. In particular, we needed to detect this 
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1 For a more complete description of the model see “The Basic Immune Simulator: An agent-based model to study the 
interactions between innate and adaptive immunity”, Theoretical Biology and Medical Modeling, 27 Sept 2007.
2 BIS can be found at http://digitalunion.osu.edu/r2/summer06/sass/
3 OldMcData  -open source data farming software can be found at http://sourceforge.net/projects/datafarm/
4 Condor - open source distributed computing software can be found at http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/
condition and output the current values of the output 
variables when it occurred.  
Our goals for the data farming runs were likewise 
modest.  We planned on selecting a few innate immune 
system-related parameters to vary, as well as varying the 
attacker over bacteria, virus, and cancer categories and 
construct a  Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) 
design.  Our intent was to observe the behavior of the model 
(via its output) at a very high level.  We wanted to verify that 
our modified version was relatively robust (i.e., it didn’t 
break) and that the results made some sense.  We did not 
intend to perform any detailed analysis of the results and, at 
this stage, made no attempt to understand the details of the 
model’s algorithms (except to the extent necessary in order to 
perform the software modifications described earlier).
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Our modified version of the BIS is data farmable.  It accepts 
XML input and each run produces a CSV output file.  Also, 
runs that enter the “immune hyper-response” state will 
output the current values of output variables before exiting 
gracefully. We performed two data farming trials of several 
hundred runs each during the course of the workshop. Each 
trial was based on an 11-factor NOLH design. We not only 
varied innate immune system-related parameters in these 
runs, but also varied several adaptive system parameters. 
However, in all runs the attacker was exclusively virus; we 
didn’t consider bacteria or cancer “attackers”.
Following is a brief description of the input variables 
used in both trials. We don’t claim to understand the full 
nature of these variables (in immunological terms) or how the 
algorithms in the model use them; understanding the 
internals of the model was not one of our goals for this 
workshop.  We chose them based on our best guesses of their 
importance in determining the outcome of the runs:
• NumDCs - Number of dendritic cells.
• PercentBAntiViral - Percentage of B cells in anti-viral 
response.
• PercentTAntiViral - Percentage of helper T cells in 
anti-viral response.
• PercentCTLAntiViral - Percentage of cytotoxic T cells 
in anti-viral response.
• NumBToSend - Number of B cells to send from the 
circulatory system.
• NumCTLToSend - Number of cytotoxic T cells to send 
from the circulatory system.
• NumDCToSend - Number of dendritic cells to send 
from the parenchymal tissue.
• NumGranZ3denom - Number of granulocytes to send 
from the lymph nodes.
• PercentProInflammatory - Percentage of dendritic cells 
that are of type 1, i.e., DC-1 cells.
• IncrementOutputSignal, OutputSignal - Two measures 
of signal strength. 
We adjusted the min and max values of the input 
variables in Trial 2 based on the results we obtained from Trial 
1.
Figure 1 - Input Variable Value Ranges for Trial 1
Figure 2 - Input Variable Value Ranges for Trial 2
We performed a very preliminary and limited analysis 
using the JMP tool.  Our primary objective in performing the 
analysis was to simply verify that the numbers and trends 
associated with certain output variables (which we 
understood or, at least, which we thought we understood) 
were reasonable in light of the input parameters.  We wanted 
to verify, to the extent we could, that the model was 
performing intuitively.  Another goal was to gain some insight 
into the semantics of the numerous input parameters and 
output variables, the semantics most of which we understood 
only to a very limited extent.
For example, in Figure 3, a regression tree generated by 
JMP indicates that the most important split occurred at the 
P e r c e n t P r o I n f l a m a t o r y i n p u t p a r a m e t e r. 
PercentProInflamatory is the percentage of dendritic cells that 
are of type 1  (i.e., DC-1).  DC-1 cells are major stimulators of T-
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cells (important adaptive immune components), so it makes 
sense that this parameter is important.   The next two most 
important input factors, functions of the number of dendritic 
cells that migrate to the infection site (NumDCToSend) and 
the total number of dentritic cells available (NumDCs) are 
also intuitively important since dentritic cells are major 
elements in combating infections.
Figure 3 - Regression Tree from Trial 1
SUMMARY
We used the open source BIS model as one means to learn 
about the immune system.  To extend our learning of this 
complex system, we modified the BIS model to make it 
easily data farmable and subsequently performed several 
computational experiments. This first attempt was 
encouraging, but there is a long way to go towards 
understanding this fascinating natural system.
We are looking forward to continue our learning in 
immunological modeling in several ways, including (but not 
limited to):
• Extending the current model (i.e., the data farmable 
version of the BIS).  This extension might involve 
modifying the algorithms and data structures of the 
current model and would require, on our part, a much 
deeper understanding of the internals (as opposed to 
the inputs and outputs) of the current model.
• Building a new model from scratch.  For this option 
and the above-mentioned option, we would need to 
significantly enhance our expertise in immunology in 
general, and the human immune system in particular.
• Using the model (current, enhanced, or new) to 
generate large amounts of data that we would then, 
using evolutionary computational or similar 
techniques, “mine” to discover interesting 
phenomena. 
•
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INTRODUCTION
Many modeling tools assume a static level of 
communications capability throughout a run, and even 
worse, a perfect level of capability.  In reality, 
communications are impacted by a wide number of 
variables that include, but are not limited to, the operational 
environment and variance in network traffic levels.  The 
modeling tools we use should factor in the complexities of 
networking if possible, but many times when we increase 
fidelity in our models we increase their complexity and 
performance, making them less valuable for quick-turn 
analysis.  
To better capture variability in communications and 
mitigate the downside of complex models, we have tied a 
high resolution communications model to New Zealand’s 
agent based model MANA.  The resulting link between the 
two models simulates MANA's situational awareness (SA) 
messages through the full protocol stack of a simulated 
network and returns the completed messages to MANA 
during run-time. 
At IDFW 17, the team was interested in exercising this 
combined modeling tool to better understand the impact of 
communications assumptions, particularly in an urban 
environment. To accomplish this, we have developed a 
scenario with agents representing a mobile convoy, infantry, 
and unmanned aerial support that deploy and cordon a 
building.   Our team had three objectives:  
• Refine the existing scenario so that it is more sensitive 
to communications capability
• Identify interesting and unique experimental designs
• Data farm in two ways: use MANA with static 
assumptions and use MANA combined with QualNet
Modeling Tools
The team used the MANA model as well  as MANA coupled 
with QualNet.  The latter is an intriguing combination of 
tools because MANA is an agent based model and QualNet 
is a physics-based discrete event simulation.  One particular 
nuance is that of timing.  QualNet simulates time down to 
the nanosecond, while MANA abstracts time, allowing the 
scenario developer to define what time means for them. 
Combining the two tools must account for this difference.
MANA allows the user to model force on force 
interactions.  However, its particular value for our team is its 
robust SA modeling capability that utilizes communications 
links between individuals or groups of agents.  What agents 
see in the battlefield become SA messages, and the modeler 
has to define how they are shared with other agents.  It is this 
powerful capability that we use to data farm static network 
assumptions throughout the duration of a run. Figure 1 
notionally describes the link between the two models.
Figure 1: Notional View of MANA-QualNet
When QualNet is combined with MANA, the 
communication parameters in MANA are ignored, and the 
SA messages become packets in a QualNet network that is 
more rigorously defined than the one we are using in MANA. 
We can model detailed urban areas, routing protocols, 
physical layer hardware, and background traffic, among other 
options.
Scenario
The scenario was originally developed to study the impact of 
jammers on communications in an urban environment.  It 
involves two companies of Stryker vehicles with embedded 
infantry, a tactical operations center (TOC), and visual 
support from two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  Enemy 
forces are comprised of fifteen agents in a designated 
building in town.  They have several lookouts positioned in 
the city to alert them of blue force movement.  Figure 2 
below shows an overview of the scenario.
Figure 2: Scenario Overview
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As the scenario unfolds, the blue force begins moving 
toward the target location in town, roughly three kilometers 
from their starting position.  The UAVs cannot see inside the 
target building, but provide visual support for the ground 
force via video links.  As the blue force nears the building, the 
lookouts inform the red force of their approach, and attempt 
to flee.  Using the UAVs and now dismounted infantry, they 
will pursue the enemy force to an extent, in an effort to 
capture or kill as many enemy forces as possible.  
The SA network is hierarchical, though not completely 
stove-piped.  It is notionally represented in Figure 3 below, 
where all links model two-way communication.  It is notional 
because it is not representative of the true number of entities 
or radios in either simulation.  In QualNet we utilized a JTRS-
WNW radio model, the urban-autoselect propagation model, 
and TDMA.  
Figure 3:  Notional Communications Structure
Finally, the battlefield had a number of non-combatants 
added to introduce additional complexity in the scenario. 
These non-combatants are processed as SA messages of 
unknown or unallied entities, potentially leading to being 
wrongly classified as friendly or enemy agents, as well as 
adding to traffic on the network.
Scenario Preparation
The team had three and a half days to work during the data 
farming workshop.  Our goal on the first day was to refine 
the scenario to a point where it was reasonable to use for 
analysis runs.  Initial, visual inspection of the scenario was 
uninteresting because the OPFOR would not leave their 
location until blue was almost on top of them.  It did not 
stress communications capability enough, nor did it provide 
enough realism for the team.  As a result, we added multiple 
OPFOR lookouts that could use cell phones or some other 
form of communications to alert occupants of the target 
building that the blue force was approaching.   This change 
had the effect of making the sensing capability of UAVs, 
vehicles, and dismounted infantry on the ground more 
critical, and thus the transmission of these messages 
increasingly critical to a successful outcome.
The team also clarified the blue force communication 
hierarchy.  Figure 3, above, is a notional view of the resultant 
architecture.  We wanted to establish a communications path 
that was representative of how information would be 
processed today.  
We also added a bit of dynamic message processing to 
the MANA model.  This leveraged previous work done that 
allows agents in MANA to be interrupted based on 
information they receive.  In the case of this scenario, if the 
UAV located a cluster (as determined by the model) of enemy 
agents, it would send a message to the TOC.  The TOC would 
spend some amount of time processing the message, and then 
task pre-selected vehicles and infantry to interrupt their 




Our first set of experiments had 64 excursions, utilizing a 
small full factorial design.  We had explored using the Near 
Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design, but our 
parameter space was complex for this approach.  Our initial 
design space is seen in table 1 below.  The process time 
parameter, the time it takes the TOC to process a message 
from a UAV, was not significant in the first experiment, and 
was removed from the second experiment.  We also 
increased the number of levels for latency as it was the most 
significant factor in the first experiment.
Parameter Experiment 1 - 
Levels




1, 20 1, 20
Accuracy (%) 75, 100 75, 100
Latency (sec.) 0, 30 0, 30, 60
Reliability (%) 30, 100 30, 100
Range meters (x10) 10, 300 10, 300
Process Time (sec.) 10, 300 --




Table 2: r2 Values
One interesting result from our MANA excursions was the 
importance of latency in this scenario.  Not only was it the 
most important factor, but in situations where the latency 
was high, the blue force actually fared better in terms of loss 
exchange ratio (LER).  After quite a bit of discussion, we 
realized that when we changed the latency parameters for 
the blue force, we also inadvertently changed the latency on 
the red force’s “cell phone” communication.  When latency 
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was high for blue, it was also high for red.  This led us to the 
conclusion that it was actually more important to stop red 
force communications than to enhance the blue force 
communications in this particular scenario.  
! Figure 4: Red Casualty Predicted Model
Two particularly interesting edge cases contained within 
these runs involved a situation where there was 93% red 
casualties (CAS), and only 6% in another.  These were 
potentially interesting in a scenario where the mean red CAS 
was 7.7 and standard deviation 2.1.  The team explored these 
specific excursions in an attempt to find emergent properties 
within the scenario.  In the 93% case the blue force 
successfully handled a fragmented order (FRAGO) from the 
TOC and went to the reference location to engage red.  The 6% 
red CAS case showed a situation where a blue vehicle became 
stuck, a statistical anomaly that could be likened to a 
vehicular breakdown.
MANA – QualNet Experiment
The team also completed a set of excursions using MANA 
connected to QualNet.  For this experiment we used the 
exact same scenario as the MANA only experiment.  The 
communication specific parameters used in MANA, 
capacity, latency, reliability, and range are not valid in this 
experiment because they are now modeled by QualNet.  Two 
of the parameters, accuracy and process time, are not 
communication specific, so we could keep them as 
parameters for these runs.  We also added two new 
parameters, channel size and radio power, to take the place 
of capacity and range respectively.  The new design of 
experiments is seen in table three below.
Parameter Excursion 1 - Levels
Accuracy (%) 75, 100
Process Time (sec.) 10, 300
Channel Size (kHz) 200, 500
Radio Power (dBm) 30, 40
Table 3:  Experiment 3 Design Space
This experiment proved several surprises in a regression 
analysis that had a r2 of .73.  Firstly, the difference between a 
1W and 10W radio (30-40 dBm) is minimal.  This was 
consistent with our observation that the scenario does not 
stress the capacity of the radios enough.  We thought the level 
of traffic would be sufficiently stressing, but without any 
background traffic or large number of units to generate SA, it 
is relatively insignificant.  This result may not be the case in a 
real world environment.
The second surprise showed that processing time was 
the most important factor in the experiment.  This was 
interesting considering that processing time was the least 
important in the initial  MANA experiment, so much so that 
we removed it from the second design.  Despite this 
difference, we saw that increased process time correlates to an 
increase in red CAS.  A possible explanation is that the 
messages being sent to the TOC are being processed and sent 
back out as a FRAGO order to a location that is not a hotspot 
by the time the units arrive.  A short TOC processing time 
doesn’t appear to impact this.  Visual inspection of the model 
demonstrated that as FRAGOs were followed, they were 
taking place too early in the scenario, and had a negative 
impact on the outcome.  A long process time would delay the 
FRAGO from being sent, allowing the blue force to get into a 
position that would better effect the outcome.
CONCLUSIONS
The work conducted at IDFW 17 was an initial 
exploration into urban communications.  It has laid the 
foundation for future analyses with this scenario, and 
assessment of how operating in an urban environments can 
impact communications.  One area for further analysis would 
be to leverage the dynamic tasking of agents.  Instead of 
sending ground forces to investigate, use the UAV as a direct 
fire weapon, something more consistent with today’s 
operational activities.  
Further work will involve stressing the impact of 
incorporating a high fidelity communications model in data 
farming exercises.  We did see that mean red CAS across the 
exercises were quite similar, but there was a striking variation 
in the message completion rate (MCR) and end to end delay, 
as seen in table four below.  
Comparison Mean Red CAS MCR E-E Delay
MANA Only 11.21 30%-100% 1-30s
MANA - QualNet 10.43 12% .3-350s
Table 4: Comparison of MANA and MANA-QualNet
In a MANA only simulation, you would have to make 
static assumptions about MCR or latency.  We chose 30% and 
100%, but the MANA – QualNet completion rate was around 
12%.  Similarly the delay ranged anywhere from .3 seconds to 
350 seconds depending on network conditions, battlefield 
position and other factors.  It is precisely this type of 
discrepancy we plan to investigate in future workshops. 
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Team 10: Combat Identification and Fratricide: 
Realistic Scenarios
TEAM 10 MEMBERS











Over the past two years TNO and Dstl developed an Agent 
Based Combat ID Model to support the research on factors 
influencing the success and failure of the Combat 
Identification processes. The model represents Situation 
Awareness (SA) and the cognitive processes to combine 
sensor input with SA in order to make identification 
decisions. During IDFW 15 and 16, we evaluated this model 
by conducting a number of data farming experiments. A 
description of the model and the results of these experiments 
can be found in [1] and [2]. 
A more general treatment about an architecture for 
placing the human at the centre of a constructive simulation, 
which also contains a more extensive description of this agent 
based combat ID model, can be found in the ICCRTS 2008 
paper [3]
This paper describes the progress we made with the 
model development since IDFW 16 and the results from the 
data farming experiments we conducted during a side 
meeting of IDFW 17, which was held in the Hague on the 13th 
and 14th of October 2008. 
TEAM 10 GOALS FOR IDFW17
Since the last workshop, as announced in our IDFW 16 team 
report, a scenario driven model was developed. This version 
is more attractive and recognizable for the customer, allows 
us to model and simulate real fratricide incidents, and gives 
more control on the initial setup of the situation and the 
movement of the agents.
The main features of this new agent based model are:
• Both the Ground Truth and the Perceived Truth 
distribution can be defined specifically (in stead of the 
triangle distributions used in the previous version).
• Waypoints for the identifying agents and objects can 
be assigned, which allows them to move along a 
predefined path (instead of the semi-random 
movements of the identifying agent and static position 
of objects in the previous version).
• The movement of one identifying agent can be tuned 
to the movement of other identifying agents, which 
allows for more realistic teamwork.
• Obstructions in the terrain were introduced, which 
break the line-of-sight of identifying agents.
• A separate application can be used to specify the 
scenario and write this scenario to a file. This file can 
be executed by the scenario based application.
• More than one identifying agents can be defined, each 
with its own Global and Local SA (instead of just one 
agent as is the case in previous versions).
The goal for IDFW 17 of the Combat ID team was to:
Discover the influence of  different factors on the effectiveness 
of the Combat ID process, in a scenario based agent based 
model, by using NOLH experimental designs and 
datafarming techniques.
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
In the preparations for this workshop TNO made a 
representative scenario with 8 variations of the paths the 
identifying agents follow and the quality of the 
preconception (the start ‘value’ of the situation awareness). 
A new version of an agent based model developed in 
NETLOGO was used to run the scenarios. The influence of 
factors was tested with datafarming techniques which 
included the use of an NOLH to specify a set of different 
settings for the influencing factors resulting in a representative 
set of datapoints. The experiment ran on a simple grid of three 
computers with Condor and OldMcdata. JMP was used to 
analyze the output and discover trends.
The factors of influence included the characteristics of the 
information acceptance curves, decision thresholds and local 
and global situation awareness characteristics.
The Scenario
The scenario represents an event in a common mission like 
one in southern Afghanistan conducted by an international 
coalition that includes a large number of actors. The 
characteristics of such events inherently have a high 
potential for fratricide and neutricide (killing of neutral 
persons) incidents, which among other things can be caused 
by: 
• There are no clear frontlines anymore.
• Operations are mostly conducted in urban terrain.
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• The appearance of Opposing Military Forces (OMF) 
and the local population are often similar.
• The OMF use the population as a shield against 
kinetic effects of coalition forces.
• The Coalition Forces have to contact civilians as part 
of their assignment (winning hearts and minds).
The specific scenario used consists of an action of a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in a small village in 
Uruzgan. They have to contact the local population while 
having uncertainty about the exact locations of OMF in a 
build-up area. The team will be supported by a battle group. 
During their movement, the coalition-troops encounter 
Taliban. Movements of the agents were modeled after real 
drills. 
Figure 1: A representation of the basis scenario
To generate different degrees of potential for fratricide 
and neutricide, two dimensions of variation are introduced, 
on top of the basic scenario:
4. Differences in Situational awareness (SA), described 
in Table 1.
No SA at all Distribution belief of initial SA=(0.33, 
0.33, 0.33)
Uncertain SA Distribution belief of initial SA on 
boundaries between clusters of 
different types of objects in ground 
truth is blurred 
Perfect SA Distribution belief of initial SA in 
accordance to ground truth
Wrong SA   Distribution belief of initial SA 
contrary to ground truth
Table 1: Four types of Situation Awareness
5. Tactical variations:
• Objects acting according plan (PRT move into 
positions as planned, compliant to the 
common operational picture).
• Objects not acting according plan (PRT 
moves into wrong positions, not compliant to 
the common operational picture).
These two dimensions result in the following eight 
variations that will be tested in separate datafarming runs 
using the NOLH described in the next paragraph: 
1. No SA at all  correct movement
2. Perfect SA  correct movement
3. Uncertain SA  correct movement
4. Wrong SA  correct movement
5. No SA at all  incorrect movement
6. Perfect SA  incorrect movement
7. Uncertain SA  incorrect movement
8. Wrong SA incorrect movement
! Figure 2a, b: Netlogo representations of scenario 7 
Figure 2a and 2b show the beginning and the end of the 
Netlogo representations of scenario 7.
The NOLH
We used an NOLH with 65 design points based on the 
following set of datafarmable parameters [1, 2]:
• Information Acceptance Level (openness for sensor 
information)
• Y–intercept indicator (openness for sensor information 
in case of extreme high or low preconceptions)
• Decision Threshold (the level of confidence at which a 
decision is taken)
• Surprise Level (a measure for the amount of change in 
global situation awareness when the sensor output 
contradicts the preconception) 
• The size of the local SA
• The detection range (the range at which the sensors 
can detect objects
For each design point, ten simulation runs were 
conducted.
The Measures of Effectiveness used are: 
• Number of objects identified as a  fraction of the total 
number of objects
• The fratricide percentage (number of friendly objects 
identified as enemy compared to total number of 
friendly objects)
• The neutricide percentage (number of neutral objects 
identified as enemy compared to total number of 
objects identified as enemy)
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RESULTS
The results of the data farming runs were analyzed with the 
statistical software tool JMP. The Analysis of the results of 
the first two runs, let to the discovery of an error in the code, 
an undesired interdependency between two variables and 
the discovery that the initial preconception was dominant if 
the value for this was already above the decision threshold 
(al sensor input was ignored if that was the case). We 
corrected the error, chose another set of parameter settings 
and conducted a number of new runs. We chose a decision 
threshold between 0.7 and 0.9 and limited the initial SA to 
0.66. With these settings the initial SA was always below the 
decision threshold. This situation means that the sensors 
have to be used at least once before reaching an 
identification decision.
We produced a number of different graphs based on the 
output of the last data farming runs. 
We used JMP to see if there is an estimate model that 
represents the simulation, in which the outcome of the 
simulation model can be explained by the parameters which 
were varied. In doing so we used the modules “partition 
tree” and the Least Square method for the second order 
model. The outcomes of these two methods proved to be 
consistent.
Figure 3: Fraction decided on per scenario
Figure 3 shows the minimum, average and maximum 
“fraction decided on” for the eight scenarios. 
The figure shows that the highest percentage of decisions 
can be reached in scenarios without SA (scenario 1  and 5). The 
lowest scores are obtained in scenarios with some form of SA 
(either correct, wrong or uncertain) and correct movement 
(scenario 2, 3 and 4). Scenarios with incorrect movements all 
have high scores. Analyses of individual scenario runs 
showed that the incorrect movements in combination with the 
terrain features and the placement of the objects led to more 
favorable conditions to detect objects.
The analyses with JMP showed that the detection range 
has the most significant influence on the fraction decided on: a 
decrease of a detection range leads to a decrease of the 
fraction decided on. In other words, the ability to detect 
objects at a larger range, leads to more identifications (not 
necessary correct ones). 
Depending on the scenario, the size of the local SA or the 
decision threshold are secondary important parameter. 
Figure 4: Fraction fratricide per scenario
Figure 4 shows the fratricide percentages per scenario. 
This figure shows that there is no fratricide in those cases that 
the PRT makes a correct movement (scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4) or 
when the PRT has no SA (scenario 1 and 5). If the PRT makes 
an incorrect movement and has at least some form of SA 
(scenario 6, 7 and 8), fratricide occurs. It is also obvious that 
uncertain SA (scenario 7) lead to more fratricide than wrong 
or right SA that both result in an equal score. We do not have a 
clear explanation for this phenomenon yet. 
Further analyses show that in cases with fratricide a 
higher decision threshold leads to a lower fratricide fraction.  
Figure 5: Fraction neutricide per scenario
Figure 5 shows the neutricide percentages per scenario. 
The figure shows that no neutricide occurs if there is no SA 
(scenario 1 and 5). Uncertain SA leads to the highest 
neutricide fractions and correct and wrong SA both lead to 
more or less the same neutricide fractions. 
The neutricide results are independent from the tactical 
variations and are mainly caused by variations in SA. In this 
respect, the neutricide results differ from the fratricide results. 
For scenario 2, 3  and 4 (some form of SA and correct 
movement) there was no fratricide, but there is a considerable 
amount of neutricide. Further analyses showed that the 
fratricide is mainly caused by the low number and the 
placement of friendly objects. 
In cases where there is some form of SA (scenarios 2, 3, 4, 
6, 7 and 8) the decision threshold is the main factor of 
influence: the fraction neutricide will decrease if the decision 
threshold increases. The neutricide is also influenced by a 
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secondary parameter: Increases of the size of the Local SA lead 
to less neutricide. This result is consistent with the fratricide 
results.
CONCLUSIONS
Analyses of the results shows that most results are consistent 
with our understanding of the information processing 
mechanisms of the agents.  In particular:
• In cases where the preconception is higher than the 
required threshold, as was the case for some of the 
design points in our first runs, decisions are taken 
without actually looking at the sensor data. 
• Larger detection ranges (read: better sensors) lead to 
more detections and a higher percentage of objects 
that were identified.
• Tactical variations did have an influence on fratricide, 
but not on neutricide. The particular placement and 
low numbers of friendly objects caused the difference 
for fratricide. 
• Having no initial SA, i.e. an equal distribution of 
initial  belief in friendly, neutral  or enemy, is the most 
favorable condition to reach a high percentage of 
objects decided on, and low fractions of fratricide and 
neutricide. This seems to be contradictory, but can be 
explained by the fact that SA in our model is not really 
an enabler but is in fact a disturbing factor that acts in 
the role of preconception, so perhaps a change in 
name should be considered. Also, one has to take into 
account that the agents do not experience threat. In 
other words, they can come as close as necessary to 
identify an object.
• Apart from the number and placement of objects, the 
decision threshold is the determining factor on both 
fratricide and neutricide: if the agent is able to take a 
decision with low certainty (low decision threshold), 
more fratricide and neutricide occurs.
• Uncertain SA lead to higher rates of fratricide and 
neutricide compared to wrong or correct SA. 
THE WAY AHEAD
The agent based combat ID model
During the design of the scenario, during the workshop and 
during the analysis of the results a number of desired 
features were discovered that would make the model more 
useful. The main ones are: 
• Increase the size of the world.
• Include Battlefield Management and communication 
features (radio, blue force tracking, BMS, BTID) to 
exchange information between agents.
• Allow the decision threshold to change if the threat of 
enemy fire changes. A low threat might be 
accompanied by a higher threshold. 
• The level of threat experienced by the agent should 
become a Measure of Merit. 
• Include a  battle damage assessment function and the 
resulting influence on decision threshold during a run. 
Troops evaluating their actions as neutricide or 
fratricide will become less confident of their basic SA. 
Also, confidence of troops might get stronger during a 
run.
• Implement a distinction between the preconception 
and the confidence in this preconception. The 
confidence can vary per location. 
• Implement the same distinction for sensors. 
Other issues
Although we identified enough desired features to generate 
a new useful version of our current combat ID model in 
NETLOGO, the current version seems to be at the edge of 
what is possible and useful in this environment. In the 
coming months a decision has to be made whether to 
continue with the current NETLOGO model or to 
incorporate the mechanisms of the current model in another 
constructive simulation that already has a mature combat 
model.
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 International Data Farming Workshop 18 
When: 22-27 March 2009
Where: Embassy Suites Hotel, Monterey California USA 
Please go to http://harvest.nps.edu/ at the IDFW 18 link for additional information and registration.
The workshop fee will be is $450. 
Tentative Agenda 
Sunday, March 22: Opening reception and dinner at 1800 at the Embassy Suites Hotel
Monday, March 23: Opening briefs and team poster sessions in the morning, then begin work in teams
Tuesday - Thursday, March 24 - 26: Work in teams (optional plenary sessions in the mornings)
Friday, March 27: Outbriefs and Closing Ceremony in the morning
Call for Team 
Leaders / Plenary 
Speakers: 
Please email 
gehorne@nps.edu with your 
choice of teams and if you 
want to lead a team or 
present a plenary briefing. 
Conference Fee: 
The registration fee is $450. Registration pays for: 
• Conference rooms •  Opening dinner
• 5 Lunches •  Conference materials
• Break food and drinks •  Fun
Dynamic Truths
International Data Farming Workshop 18
March 22-27, Monterey, California USA
